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Abstract In the last decade Dynamic Bayesian Networks
(DBNs) have become one type of the most attractive
probabilistic modelling framework extensions of Bayesian
Networks (BNs) for working under uncertainties from a
temporal perspective. Despite this popularity not many
researchers have attempted to study the use of these net-
works in anomaly detection or the implications of data
anomalies on the outcome of such models. An abnormal
change in the modelled environment’s data at a given time,
will cause a trailing chain effect on data of all related
environment variables in current and consecutive time
slices. Albeit this effect fades with time, it still can have an
ill effect on the outcome of such models. In this paper we
propose an algorithm for pilot error detection, using DBNs
as the modelling framework for learning and detecting
anomalous data. We base our experiments on the actions of
an aircraft pilot, and a flight simulator is created for run-
ning the experiments. The proposed anomaly detection
algorithm has achieved good results in detecting pilot
errors and effects on the whole system.
Keywords Anomaly detection  Pilot error detection 
Dynamic Bayesian Networks  Outlier detection 
Machine learning
Introduction
It has been over a century since the Wright brothers made
history by building man’s first fixed wing controlled hea-
vier than air aeroplane. During that century human kind
made a giant leap in the development and use of aeroplanes
in many aspects of life, and along with that came aeroplane
related disasters, which lead to a great focus on aviation
safety measures and protocols.
Aviation disasters started since the first days of avia-
tion, and are still occurring up until this present day,
although an enormous amount of effort has been done to
prevent these from occurring and to a certain extent it has
been very successful, there is still a very long way before
preventing further disasters. According to statistics from
Kebabjian (2013), there has been over 1085 commercial
aeroplane accidents involving fatalities over the past half
century, as shown in Fig. 1. There have been many rea-
sons behind these accidents, but they can be generally
categorised into a limited number of main causes,
including:
• Pilot error related accidents
• Other human error related accidents
• Weather related accidents
• Mechanical failure related accidents
These and other main causes are listed in more detail
and by the number of crashes per cause per decade in
Table 1. Figure 2 shows that pilot caused errors are the
main reason, about 51 % of all these crashes.
Therefore it is crucial to take all possible measures to
detect a pilot error at the first time when it occurs before
causing a big problem and take the right action to recover if
any mistakes made. The method developed in this paper
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help to build such capability by reasoning the data col-
lected from the flight parameters and pilot actions.
A vast amount of effort has been made towards pre-
venting pilot errors that can have serious consequences,
and most of modern day aeroplanes come equipped with
many safety and alarm devices that help pilots achieve
their tasks as safely as possible. Most airline companies
have their own pre-flight check lists which insure every-
thing is implemented according to the latest safety mea-
sures, and they also have emergency check lists which
pilots use in the case of emergencies to handle the problem
in hand.
Fig. 1 Number of accidents with 100 or more fatalities by year (Kebabjian 2013)
Table 1 Causes of fatal accidents by decade (Kebabjian 2013)
Cause 1950s (%) 1960s (%) 1970s (%) 1980s (%) 1990s (%) 2000s (%) All
Pilot error 41 34 24 26 27 30 30
Pilot error (weather related) 10 17 14 18 19 19 16
Pilot error (mechanical related) 6 5 5 2 5 5 5
Total pilot error 57 56 43 46 51 54 51
Other human error 2 9 9 6 9 5 7
Weather 16 9 14 14 10 8 12
Mechanical failure 21 19 20 20 18 24 20
Sabotage 5 5 13 13 11 9 9
Other cause 0 2 1 1 1 0 1
Fig. 2 Flight accident causes
However, there are still circumstances where pilot
actions do lead to accidents, some of these accidents are
due to the fact that pilots were not following regulations.
But another major cause behind many of the remaining
accidents is something called ‘‘error chain’’ or a chain of
events that lead to an accident, some of the events in this
chain are due to pilot actions but the decisive factors are
caused by other unforeseen elements in the environment.
An example of such disaster is a recent aeroplane crash in
Nigeria, the preliminary accident investigation report (AIB
2013) has shown that the main reason behind this crash was
a series of events, including a pilot’s action of not
deploying flaps during the take-off(which is considered a
standard procedure). However this action by itself could
not have brought the aeroplane down (AIB 2013), the other
events in the chain were that an error in the engines
reduced the aeroplane’s thrust, and that accompanied with
an overly steep rotating or climbing angle, eventually lead
the aeroplane into what is known as an aerodynamic stall,
ultimately causing the aeroplane to crash into the ground. If
the pilot had the knowledge of his action’s effects and what
set of events caused this stall the outcome might have been
very different. This is why we are focusing our efforts on
detecting the types of pilot errors that if were combined
with other events the result would be an undesirable
outcome.
The anomalies that we are investigating in our paper, are
those of pilot actions in the context of a flight between two
airports, and these types of anomalies are contextual
meaning that they are only considered as anomalies or
errors when put in a certain context, so the main way for
our approach is to detect the effects of these anomalies
sometime after their occurrence, and the algorithm that we
will discuss later will detect these anomalies through
tracing their effects back from the unwanted system state.
This anomaly detection algorithm can help to modify
pilot activities in an effort to decrease flight accidents
caused by pilot actions. this can be implemented in two
ways:
Diagnoses approach A real time method for detecting
the cause of current system behaviour, (i.e. what is the
most likely sequence of events that lead the aeroplane to
the current unwanted state). This could be very helpful in
emergency circumstances as it might save valuable time
(needed to deal with the emergency itself) through early
detection of the causes.
Prognosis approach A real time method that will use
approximate inference to predict the state of the flight in
the future given all the system observations up until this
moment. This method will work with each change in the
whole system, it will predict the system state up until a
predefined point t ? k in the future. If the system state was
found to be of an unwanted type with a high level of cer-
tainty, the pilot is warned of the possible outcomes of his
action and urged to take an alternative action.
There are a number of approaches for detecting anom-
alies from data which inspire our algorithm development.
Many studies have been made just to give a clearer
understanding of anomalies, and to answer all the questions
around them. For a more in-depth look at data anomaly
detection and its variations, see survey papers: (Hodge and
Austin 2004; Chandola et al. 2009; Patcha and Park 2007;
Markos and Singh 2003a, b; Bakar et al. 2006). For this
paper we will only give a brief insight to the major
approaches taken to solve anomaly detection.
According to Hodge and Austin (2004) and Chandola
et al. (2009), most of the approaches to solving the
anomaly detection problem can be categorised into a few
main categories:
Statistical approaches
Statistical approaches for anomaly detection mainly use
statistical models to model normal data of the environment.
Once a model is trained, it is then used to calculate sta-
tistical probabilities of a given data instance and label it as
normal or anomalous, depending on its likelihood of
belonging to the learnt model. This is often done by
comparing its probability to a certain threshold. An
example of a statistical approach is that of Aggarwal and
Yu (2001) where the authors deal with high dimensional
data. Their data could have up to hundred of dimensions,
and the main focus of their work is to introduce a technique
that finds outliers through the behaviour of projections
from datasets, as high dimensional data cannot be
approached by the regular data proximity algorithms.
Classification approaches
Classification is one of the most popular approaches
towards anomaly detection, the basic idea behind classifi-
cation is to classify data instances and decide whether it’s
normal or anomalous. The classifier is trained on labelled
instances of data. The trained model or classifier is then
used to detect anomalies within the unlabelled testing data.
Chandola et al. (2009) and Upadhyaya and Singh (2012)
summarised various different algorithms and methods in
this category. Support vector machines (SVMs) are used to
build an intrusion detection system which monitors the
access to the Windows registry key (Heller et al. 2003).
Bayesian Networks have been used for anomaly detection
in a multi-class setting. In the testing phase the posterior
probability of the most likely class is calculated, leading to
the classification of a normal class, or an anomaly. Das and
Schneider (2007) have addressed the problem of anomaly
detection in high arity categorical data, through modelling
normal data using a Bayesian Network. The novelty in
their approach is that they compare test instances against
marginal distribution of attribute subsets. Neural Networks
are used as a multi-class or one-class detector. Han et al.
(2004) have proposed an intrusion detection technique
based on evolutionary neural networks. It takes shorter
time to obtain a superior neural network than traditional
neural networks, because it learns the structure and weights
simultaneously. for more information please refer to
(Markos and Singh 2003b; Chandola et al. 2009) survey
papers. Zhang et al. (2013a) proposed a method that
extracted psychophysiological features to characterise the
operators functional state (OFS), then used a Fuzzy c-mean
(FSM) algorithm to classify the OFS. this approach is very
promising if implemented in the context of detecting the
unwanted OFS of a pilot during flight operations. Zhang
et al. (2013b) have used multiple psychophysiological and
performance measures to build a data-driven model, that is
used to estimate the human operator cognitive state(HCS)
in a safety-critical human-machine interaction system.
They have used an improved sparse least squares support
vector machine (LS-SVM) and a Sparse and Weighted
one(WLS-SVM) to model the HCS. Both approaches have
shown great performance in detecting temporal fluctuation
trends of the HCS.
Clustering approaches
Clustering approaches work under different assumptions, it
mainly focuses on the idea that normal data instances occur
in clusters (these could be large and dense) given a simi-
larity measure whilst anomalous data occur outside these
clusters or further away from their centre or in a smaller
and less dense clusters. Nearest neighbour is one of the
most common clustering approaches. Noh et al. (2006)
have proposed a method for network anomaly detection
based on clustering sequences of patterns, these patterns
represent one TCP network session which is based on the
packets of the session.
Not many researchers have used DBN models as basis
for anomaly detection. Hill et al. (2007) have developed
coupled and uncoupled DBN anomaly detectors which aim
to detect erroneous data in two different windspeeds data
streams, including single or multiple data streams in real
time. Shotwell and Slate (2011) suggested an anomaly
detection algorithm using a new implementation of the
Dirichlet process precision parameter. Outlier detection is
done by calculating a maximum a posteriori (MAP) of the
data partition, where observations forming small or sin-
gleton clusters are deemed as anomalies. Babbar and
Chawla (2010) have used a Bayesian Network to model the
outliers as an ‘‘unlikely events under the current favored
theory of the domain’’. They used a Bayesian network to
model the background knowledge coupled with two rules
to detect the outliers. It does not only focus on detecting
outliers but also on explaining why these data are consid-
ered outliers. Other researchers use an unsupervised
approach towards detecting fraud operations in a stock
exchange market. (Ferdousi and Maeda 2006) is one of
such examples, they use peer group analysis (PGA) tech-
nique to characterise the expected pattern of behaviour
around the targeted time series financial sequence in terms
of the behaviour of similar objects and then detect outliers
through analysing the difference in evolution between
abnormal behaviour and expected behaviour.
Anomaly detection using Dynamic Bayesian Networks
Dynamic Bayesian Network model
Bayesian Networks are a type of probabilistic models that
are based on directed acyclic graphs (DAGs) (Pearl and
Russell 2003), the nodes in this model represent propo-
sitional variables of interest and the links between them
represent the dependencies among these variables. These
dependencies are quantified by conditional probabilities of
each node given its parents in the network. They have
been used extensively by the research community. Tu
et al. (2009) introduced an action relationship database
(ARDB) structured as a Bayesian Network, which used
Bayesian statistics to update its knowledge with new input
examples. A model of memory reconsolidation provided
the input and predicted relevant activities based on the
ARDB.
A Dynamic Bayesian Network is the extension of
Bayesian Networks to model probability distributions of
sets of random variables over time (Murphy 2002a). Nodes
in our DBN model Zt
k are divided into two sets where
t represents the slice number which indicates the time
variable, and k is the number of nodes in each slice. The
first set contains the hidden state nodes Xt
n = { Xt
1, Xt
2,
Xt
3,…, Xtn } , where n represents the number of hidden
states in each slice. Hidden states represent immeasurable
variables in our model, and these are usually the variables
that we aim to gather information about. In Fig. 3 the
hidden nodes are the pilot action nodes. And the second set
is the set of observable nodes Yt
m = { Yt
1, Yt
2, Yt
3, …, Ytm },
where m represents the number of observable nodes in each
slice. In Fig. 3 the observable nodes are the aircraft sensor
nodes. Observable nodes represent variables that can be
measured and are completely or partially observable. These
are sometimes called evidence nodes. Note that n ?
m = k in our model.
Before learning of the model, the structure of the net-
work has to be specified. This is done through specifying
the parameters of the network, and then the arcs between
them which specify the relationship between different
variables. The priori information is represented by prior
probability distribution over the model’s structure and
parameters. This is something known as the initial
knowledge, in which we use with training data to get a
posterior probability distribution over the model and
parameters as described in (Ghahramani 1998). We want to
compute the maximum likelihood estimate of the param-
eters given the model and data. Since only partial observ-
ability of data is available, the expectation maximisation
(EM) algorithm will be used, which works by alternating
between two steps to maximise the log likelihood with
respect to Q and h, where Q is some distribution over the
hidden variable and h represents the parameters. The two
EM steps (Ghahramani 1998) are:
E step : Qkþ1  argmax
Q
PðXjY ; hkÞ where Q is any
distribution over the hidden variables X, Y is the set of
observable variables and hk represents the parameters at
point k.
M step : hkþ1  argmax
h
P
X
PðXjY ; hkÞ logPðXjY; hÞ
where hk?1 represent the model’s parameters at point k ? 1,
X is the set of hidden variables, Y is the set of observable
variables and h represents the models parameters.
Each DBN slice contains n hidden variable nodes
which represent pilot actions, and m observable and
measurable nodes which represent different simulation
variables, and these are all observable in our model as you
can see in Fig. 3. The connections between model nodes
are set according to actual relationships between the
modelled environment variables see Fig. 4 for an exam-
ple. Inter slice connections are restricted to hidden nodes.
In the DBN model we set a prior probability distribution
over the structure and parameters P(X1), and we learn a
state-transition model P(Xt|Xt-1), and an observation
model P(Yt|Xt) from the data through computing the
maximum likelihood estimate over each parameter, this is
done through the EM algorithm. The model is limited to
first-order Markov:
PðXtjX1:t1Þ ¼ PðXtjXt1Þ
This is primarily done to reduce the complexity of the
model and to make all calculation with the number of
parameters in the model feasible. The observations are also
limited to conditionally first Markov.
PðYtjYt1; XtÞ ¼ PðYtjXtÞ
Therefore inter slice relations are only between hidden
states in consecutive slices.
After the model is built with different variables in the
environment and their relationships, it is trained by the EM
algorithm. After training, inference techniques are applied
to gather the information needed about hidden variables,
including filtering, prediction, classification, control,
abduction and smoothing (Murphy 2002a).
A DBN for pilot actions in a flight system
Slice t+1Slice t
Pilot Actions Pilot Actions 
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Fig. 3 A Simplified DBN model for pilot actions in a flight system
Real connection Example
Increase landing Speed 
Engine Throttle 4Engine Throttle 3Engine Throttle 2Engine Throttle 1Ground VelocityVertical SpeedAmbient Wind velocityAmbient Wind Direction
Fig. 4 An actual model connection between one pilot action and different variables in the environment
Anomaly detection using a DBN
Anomaly detection is the process of detecting patterns in data
that do not conform to the expected normal patterns. Anom-
alies are also referred to as outliers which Hawkins (1980)
defines as ‘‘an observation that deviates so much from other
observations as to arouse suspicions that it was generated by a
different mechanism’’. Our approach to anomaly detection is
not based on the typical approach which usually focuses on
detecting anomalies in general within data of a given model,
instead we take another route. When anomalies occur during
the prediction or classification process they often have a rip-
ple-like effect on the descendent states in the same slice and
consecutive slices. If the anomaly occurs in one slice, its affect
will spread to related states in the same slice and to consec-
utive slices, albeit the effect is shortly lived and soon all values
turn back to normal. So the longer the anomaly occurs, the
longer and bigger the effect is. In adaptive online learning
models if an anomaly continues to occur for a certain period of
time, the model will adapt to it and this anomaly will be then
considered to be normal. During the inference of trained
models new data is used. Data could be considered as an
anomaly due to its value which does not belong to the range of
acceptable values of a given variable; or it could have a normal
value most of the time, but it is not normal for this value to
occur at that point of time. The second type of anomalies could
pass undetected by the experts, and thus affecting descendent
states. If it continues to occur, it could lead to unexpected
values when inference is applied to the model. During take-off
if the pilot does not set the flaps to the correct setting, and when
accompanied by other unforeseen events, this could lead the
aeroplane into a aerodynamic stall. In that scenario the
expected value of the vertical speed variable is different from
the one recorded as it would be a negative value(opposed to a
positive expected value) in the state of an aerodynamic stall.
Our algorithm aims to detect this type of data anomaly.
During the inference phase, the model is supplied with a
data set containing some anomalies. The anomalies are of
an acceptable value but do not occur at the expected time,
their effect is propagated to related states in the same and
succeeding slices. We suppose that we are able to detect
these effects on other state/states Zt at slice t. Our
assumption is that all states Zt of slice t are observable with
known state values. Our objective is to go back trough the
slices until we can identify in which states Zt-k an anomaly
started to occur which have caused the values of future
states to be affected and changed. As we mentioned in the
previous section, our DBN model is first-order Markov,
and observations are conditionally first-order Markov, this
leads to the conclusion that hidden states has an affect only
on observable states of the same slice and hidden states in
the next slice and are only affected by hidden states of the
previous slice. We aim to find the node/set of nodes Xiik in
slice t - k, where k is unknown, that effectively caused a
considerable change of value in state Zt
j in slice t in com-
parison with the data of the trained model.
Filtering: calculate state over time.
PðXtjy1:tÞ
Prediction: calculate
PðXtþK jy1:tÞ for some point k [ 0 into the future
Fixed-lag smoothing: calculate
PðXtjy1:tÞ i.e., estimating the variable in m [ 0 slices in the past
given all the evidence up-to now
Fixed-interval smoothing: calculate
PðXtjy1:tÞ This is used as part of training
Viterbi decoding: calculate
argmaxx1:t Pðx1:tjy1:tÞ that is finding the most likely explanation
Classification: calculate
Pðy1:tÞ ¼
P
x1:t
Pðx1:tjy1:tÞ More detail in (Murphy, 2002a, b, 2012)
Algorithm 1 is the pseudo code for pilot error detection
using DBNs. It takes as input a state/set of states Y where
an abnormal value is detected, and produces as output the
state or set of states Xiik that started an anomaly which
caused this abnormal change of value in Y. At first the
algorithm retrieve Y related parents in the same slice,
which are a state/set of states denoted Z. For every parent
state the algorithm calculates the highest probability of any
expected value of state Zt
j at slice t given the trained model.
argmax PðZ jt jY1:t; MÞ
where Y is all observation data and M is the predefined
model.
Then this value is compared to probability of the actual
value of the state occurring, if there is a large difference
between these two values then this data is considered
anomalous. Otherwise the algorithm exits.
ðargmax PðZ jt jY1:t; MÞ  PðZ jt jYt; MÞÞ[ Threshold
Next step is to go back one slice and to compute the
probability of Zt
j occurring with its current values given all
possible values for its parent state and the trained model,
this is calculated through the state transition function of the
DBN model.
PðZ jt1jZ jt ; Y1:t; MÞ
If this is not equal to the expected value at that time slice
then the state is added to the anomaly path, otherwise it is
considered a normal state. This process is repeated for all
parent states as long as the difference in probability
between predicted and real values is above the threshold.
When this difference drops below the threshold, the state in
that slice is considered normal, and the descendent state in
next slice is considered as the first anomalous state in the
anomalous path, see Fig. 5 for the anomaly detection
process.
Experiments and results
Experimental setup and the test scenario
We started by building a DBN model based on a flight
scenario, the flight is routed between London Heathrow
and East Midlands airports in the UK. The flight duration is
40 min on average. We have used Microsoftr Flight
Simulator X as the basis for our simulation, it has an SDK
which was used to build our software. The simulator is very
realistic and accurate, and it can give us over 1,100 dif-
ferent data variables in high frame rates. We have built our
custom software that interacts with the simulator and
records all of the flight data online with the desired frame
rates.
The first phase of our work was to define the types of
anomalies that we want to work with. An anomaly can be a
single point anomaly or a list of anomalies. It can be
always as an anomaly or just anomalous for some cir-
cumstances. We want to base our anomalies on errors in
actions of a pilot, as we mentioned before. Figure 6 shows
flight data in our simulation combined with accident data
Fig. 5 Flow chart of anomaly
detection algorithm
from Aircraft Crashes Record Office (ACRO 2012). The
figures reveal that most high risk phases of flying are the
Landing and taking-off phases. Therefore in this paper we
have focused on pilot errors that could happen or affect the
flight status within these two phases.
The type of anomalies that we focus on in this paper is
that of the contextual type which means they are only
considered as anomalies when put in a certain context.
Detection techniques for simple point anomalies or errors
have already been incorporated into most modern day flight
systems, including collective errors. When investigating
contextual anomalies in flight related scenarios, we focus
on errors that are known as chain errors, or event chain
errors, which is a chain of events that can lead to an
unwanted state of flight. Typically some of these events are
related directly to pilot errors and the rest are related to
circumstances that are unforeseen by the pilot, such as the
state of mechanical parts of the flight system or even out-
side events relating to weather or other variables in the
environment. Under most circumstances pilot actions
would have not lead to an unwanted flight state, but at a
given context with a specific chain of events they would
cause an undesirable outcome.
The three types of errors that have been chosen in this
study including excess speed error, landing gear error and
flaps error can lead the aeroplane to an unwanted state. We
have focused on accidents caused by an unstable approach.
According to FSF (1998) any approach that does not meet
any of the certain recommended criteria can be considered
as unstable. According to Airbus (2006) Airbus’s Flight
Operations Briefing Notes, ‘‘continuing an unstabilised
approach is a causal factor in 40 % of all approach-and-
landing accidents’’ and ‘‘In 75 % of the off-runway
touchdown, tail strike or runway excursion/overrun
accidents, the major cause was an unstable approach.’’. The
same report stated that 66 % of unstabilised approaches are
caused by either a ‘‘High and/or fast approach or Low and/
or slow approach’’. From this point we have chosen the
excess speed parameter as an error type, but this alone is
not enough for a type of anomalies, so other events that are
unforeseen by the pilot were added, namely a high possi-
bility of a vacuum pump failure and a visual flight rules
(VFR) approach rather than a instrument flight rules (IFR)
approach was used for landing. Any pilot not taking into
account the possibility of a vacuum pump failure and
commencing into a high speed VFR landing, could face
spatial disorientation in the event of a vacuum pump fail-
ure, this combined with such a high speed landing would
reach an unwanted outcome. However if a system incor-
porates maintenance cycles into its model, then a pilot
could be warned that one of the parts has a higher than
normal chance of failure and with current high speed
action, this could lead into an unwanted state. Therefore the
high speed approach can be avoided and if the vacuum
pump fails it will only be an inconvenience rather than an
accident causing event. The same goes to the other two
types of errors we chose. The flaps error basically is to
take-off with the aeroplane flaps not set to the correct
position, this normally can be fine, but when combined
with any event disturbing the engines thrust, or/and any
event affecting the climbing angle this could lead the
aeroplane into something called an aerodynamic stall,
which has caused a number of aeroplanes to crash after
take-off. As for the landing gear error, it relates the event of
an early deployment of a landing gear, in which case the
landing gear will be deployed for a longer time. This could
lead an unstable approach due to two scenarios, if the plane
is in high altitude with certain temperature condition it will
Fig. 6 Accidents by flight phase
cause the hydraulic system of the gear to be stiff on
landing, and if the plane was in low altitude and low speed
approach, deploying the landing gear a longer time before
it should have, would cause an unnecessary drag because of
the landing gear resistance to air, this will cause the
aeroplane to descend much faster which could lead to
touching down before the intended point.
After defining the anomalies we programmed the sim-
ulator to cause an effect on the related variables when these
anomalies continued to occur, such as having a rough and
bouncy landing when landing gears were kept extended for
a longer time than they should before landing, which
resemble realistic scenarios. The good point about these
types of anomalies is that they are contextual anomalies,
meaning that when they occur they can’t be detected easily
as they represent normal data instances at different cir-
cumstances. But at some specific circumstances they occur
in, they are considered as anomalies.
The DBN model that we have built is a single layer
DBN network. Which consists of two types of nodes:
hidden nodes Xt
n representing immeasurable pilot actions
which are annotated manually into the training data sets;
and observable nodes Yt
m which represent aeroplane
instrumentation data recorded by our software. The
observable variables are of a discrete type, including binary
nodes with two possible values and nodes with multiple
possibilities. You can find some of the variables that are
represented by the observable nodes in Table 2. Due to the
large number of available simulator variables in the
experiment, we had to narrow down the numbers of vari-
ables. We have chosen variables which are essential and
related to our experiment, check Table 2 to see a few of the
flight variables that we have recorded. Fig. 7 illustrates the
whole process of the proposed approach.
Experiments and results
The model is trained under the consideration that the data
is partially observable. Since not all training data sets
contain anomalous data, the EM algorithm is used to train
the DBN. In our training sets we have introduced three
types of errors (excess speed error, landing gear error, flaps
error), each one occurring 25 times, and the remaining 75
training sets have no errors. Each one of the errors intro-
duced has its own effect. Our algorithm starts working on
the slice where the effects appeared rather than the slice
where the error began.
In the testing phase we record 99 new data sets with the
same types of errors we have introduced, with each error
type occurring in 33 different data sets. Note that these data
sets do not contain annotated pilot actions, therefore when
the algorithm begins data of the observable variables is
fetched from the testing data set; whilst data of
unobservable variables are entered manually through an
annotation step done before running the algorithm.
we start by training the model gradually and at the same
time testing the trained model with the testing data
including all the three types of selected anomalies. We
continue adding normal and anomalous training sets to the
training phase and the detection successful rate increase
gradually until algorithm reaches an overall detection rate
of 90.9 %. The data sets were divided into two equal halves
of normal and anomalous data sets when possible. The first
learning experiment was on 15 data sets 8 of which were
normal and 7 anomalous. The second was on 30 data sets
divided into 15 normal and 15 anomalous. This process
was repeated in increments of 15 data sets at each step,
those 15 were always divided in half between normal and
anomalous, either 8 normal and 7 anomalous or vice versa.
steps are repeated until a total of 150 training data sets is
reached.
Once the algorithm is trained on all 150 data sets, it was
tested on all testing sets containing each error by turn. So
Table 2 Variables used in the experiments
See (Microsoftr 2008) for the parameter explanation
Aircraft engine data (4)
General engine throttle lever position ENG1
General engine throttle lever position ENG2
General engine throttle lever position ENG3
General engine throttle lever position ENG4
Aircraft position and speed data (6)
Ground velocity
Plane latitude
Plane longitude
Plane altitude
Plane pitch degrees
Plane bank degrees
Aircraft flight instrumentation data (1)
Vertical speed
Aircraft controls data (4)
Rudder position
Elevator position
Aileron position
Flaps handle index
Aircraft landing gear data (1)
Gear position
Aircraft environment data (5)
Ambient density
Ambient temperature
Ambient pressure
Ambient wind velocity
Ambient wind direction
we began with the (excess speed error), we run the algo-
rithm on all 33 test data sets for this type of error, at the end
the algorithm detects 30 out of 33 anomalies, which rep-
resent a 90.9 % detection rate. The same is repeated again
for both landing gear and flaps errors, the algorithm detects
29 and 31 out of 33 respectively, which amounts to 87.9
and 93.9 % respectively. Table 3 shows the undetected
anomalies (3 excess speed, 4 landing gear and 2 flaps). The
algorithm stopped the detection process earlier at a wrong
state in all of these cases. Which meant all of theses states
were considered as the source of the anomaly, when in fact
they were not. Therefore all of these detections were
considered as false positives. Table 3 shows the percentage
of the path to the real anomaly state that was identified
correctly before the algorithm stopped at a wrong state. On
most non-detections, the algorithm has recognised a large
part of the anomaly path correctly.
The overall anomaly detection accuracy rate for the
whole experiment is 90.9 % with a confidence range
of ±3 %, as shown in Fig. 8.
Fig. 7 Flow chart of the whole process
Table 3 Undetected anomalies for each error type (3 excess speed, 4
landing gear and 2 flaps), along with the percentage of how much was
correctly identified from the path to the real anomaly
Excess speed error (%)
1st undetected excess speed err anomaly 90.4
2nd undetected excess speed err anomaly 82.5
3rd undetected excess speed err anomaly 66.5
Landing gear error (%)
1st undetected landing gear err anomaly 86.6
2nd undetected landing gear err anomaly 92.4
3rd undetected landing gear err anomaly 86.6
4th undetected landing gear err anomaly 89.6
Flaps error (%)
1st undetected flaps err anomaly 84.3
2nd undetected flaps err anomaly 91.5
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Fig. 8 Error results combined
Discussions and conclusions
The proposed anomaly algorithm is for a contextual type of
pilot errors. In the following we analyse the advantages and
disadvantages of our algorithm in comparison with other
main types of anomaly detection algorithms, including
classifications based algorithms, clustering based algo-
rithms, nearest neighbour based algorithms and informa-
tion theoretic based algorithms.
The outcome of the anomaly detection process comes
with a probability which can give an indication of how
certain the algorithm of the detection result, which most
classification based, cluster based and nearest neighbour
based algorithms cannot provide, they only classify the
results into anomalous or normal without giving any other
useful information.
Another main advantage is that there aren’t many
algorithms implemented for detecting anomalies with
respect to the temporal dimension, which DBN can deal
with.
The main disadvantage is like many other classification
and statistical based algorithms, our algorithms needs a
considerable amount of time for the training phase, but this
does not affect its deployability in online scenarios since
the testing phase is done in real time. Another accompa-
nying disadvantage is that the training phase requires a
large number of data instances.
Our approach is for a contextual type abnormality
detection, which means it needs an unwanted flight variables
to be present in order for the algorithm to start the search,
unlike clustering algorithms which can work unsupervised.
In this paper we focus on detecting data anomalies in a
DBN model. A novel algorithm to detect data anomalies
has been proposed through backtracking steps of its effect
on descendent states until a data anomaly is reached and
detected. A DBN model have been built based on pilot
actions and instrument data of a flight scenario. The
experimental results show its robustness in detecting data
anomalies that affect other future states in the model.
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